In his book “The Storm Before the Calm,” geopolitical strategist George Friedman writes about two overlapping cycles he observes in American history. The first is the “Institutional Cycle” (“IC”) which will be the subject of this blog post. The second is the “Socio-Economic Cycle” which will be the subject of the next. The IC lasts for approximately 80 years ending in an institutional crisis which once solved begins the next IC. The United States has experienced three ICs since its founding and if the pattern holds, the fourth IC will begin some time around 2030. Each time the cycle runs its course, the institutions that make up the United States (most notably the federal government and the states) change their relationship to one another. This change becomes necessary because the former arrangement that was successful at the beginning of the previous cycle stop working at its end. Put another way, the solution to the last problem eventually creates a new problem which requires a new solution. Friedman points out that war is a frequent catalyst for change in this area
The first IC was born of the Revolutionary War and the drafting of the Constitution in 1787. This cycle established the federal government but left its relationship to the states ambiguous. The Constitution provided a framework for the United States being an “invented country” based upon an idea rather than an ethnicity. It is not the purpose of this blog post to argue in favor of a country based on an ethnicity or not. There seems to be advantages and disadvantages to both. One advantage of an invented country is that it can reinvent itself when its institutions stop working. This is one reason why (argues Friedman) the United States is able to continue to thrive.
Invention is embedded in all parts of American culture, from technology to society. Other countries, like Russia and Vietnam, are not invented… When these countries reach a point where the way they operate no longer works, they might flounder, be paralyzed or fall into chaos. Their core becomes inflexible. The United States metabolizes change differently… Invention, not tradition, is cherished.
Friedman, George. The Calm Before the Storm, New York, 2020. p. 96.
The first IC, left the relationship between the federal and state governments ambiguous. This worked for a while but became more and more problematic over time and eventually stopped working completely at the time of the Civil War. The second IC began at the end of the Civil War in 1865 and the adoption of the 13th, 14th and 15th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, thus settling the problem of ambiguity and establishing the supremacy of the federal government over the states. This supremacy was rooted in the federal government’s ability to enforce the U.S. Constitution on, and limit the sovereignty of the states. During the second IC the federal government largely did not interfere with individual citizens, private property or business which planted the seeds for the problem which would bring about the third IC.
The third IC began with the Great Depression and World War II. The Depression required federal intervention (argues Friedman) in order prevent social unrest which could threaten the governing institutions. Under the presidency of Franklin Roosevelt, the federal government instituted the New Deal which in itself did not end the Depression but established the precedent that the federal government could interfere with the economy because it was in some manner responsible for it. The third IC also put into practice that the governing class in the United States should be comprised of experts whose expertise was credentialed by a college degree. This in turn created a governing class of technocrats who are presently in control but reaching the end of their tenure. This is because their way of governing which successfully saw the US through World War II and the Cold War is no longer successful and is the reason for the present institutional crisis.
The [present] institutional crisis is rooted in two things. First, the governing class, and the technocrats, accumulate power and wealth, and they begin to shape the institutions to protect their interests. The second problem is that the expertise that won World War II and built the postwar world is now encountering it own problem of inefficiency…
Friedman. p. 110.
The third IC also saw a dramatic increase in the power of the presidency relative to the other branches of the federal government. This was largely because of the threat of nuclear war. If another country were to launch a nuclear attack on the US, there would be no time for the President to consult Congress. As such, the power to wage war, although constitutionally the jurisdiction of Congress has been de facto usurped by the President out of necessity. Again, we see that war (or the threat of war) is the catalyst which changes the relationship between the institutions that govern the United States.
The crisis is this: institutions built on expertise are no longer working. The federal government is increasingly diffuse and entangled and cannot operate in a timely or efficient manner. Universities are increasingly inefficient, with tuition and student loans at staggering levels, making the cost of acquiring credentials increasingly out of the reach of much of the population… The accumulation of wealth by experts, combined with the decreasing efficiency of technocracy, is creating the third institutional crisis… President Trump came into office promising to “drain the swamp,” a metaphor for attacking technocracy, but he had neither the clarity as to how to proceed nor the political base from which to do it. The country was still divided down the middle, with the technocrats successfully defending their institutions.
The third institutional crisis in now in its first stages, driven by the new and uncomfortable position of the United States in the world and the long jihadist wars. The United States is looking for a new framework for dealing with the world, but it can’t readily do so in the framework of the third institutional cycle.
Friedman. p. 114-115.
The solutions to institutional crises do not reveal themselves with specificity until implemented. As such (argues Friedman) the individuals occupying the positions of power are not as important or influential as the larger political forces at work which constrain push those people occupying positions of power to act as they do. I would like to think that the present culture of wokeness is a result of this governing technocracy and that the present institutional crisis which presumably will dethrone the technocrats will also dethrone wokeness as well. I guess we will know with certainty by 2030.